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WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND HIGH STRESS
OCCUPATIONS: APPLICATION OF WISCONSIN'S
UNUSUAL STRESS TEST TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1990, a police officer on duty in Port Washington, Wisconsin,
found himself confronted with a situation uncommon to a small commu-
nity. He was called to a scene involving a 17-year-old who threatened
several officers with a knife.' As the youth lunged toward him, the of-
ficer pulled his gun, shot, and wounded the youth.2 Following this inci-
dent, the officer was unable to work and engaged in "uncharacteristic
behavior" including using "white powder which he believed to be co-
caine," firing a gun into a basement wall, and exposing himself to a video
camera at a local carwash.3 Diagnosed with a mental disability known as
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), the officer has been off-duty
since the incident and has filed a claim for lifetime disability benefits.4
The city of Port Washington is contesting the case.5
The risk of violent encounters in the area of law enforcement is all
too common in today's crime-filled society.6 In fact, the case described
above may even be deemed "routine" in a high crime district.7 How-
ever, in the small-town environment of rural Wisconsin, a shooting is
anything but routine.
When confronted with a life-threatening situation, many officers de-
velop stress-related mental conditions that often render them incapable
of performing their jobs.8 Less than twenty years ago, an employee's
chance of success in gaining workers' compensation benefits for a mental
illness was slimY Recently, however, many courts have recognized
1. Matt Devine, Officer Submits Disability Claim, MILwAuKEE J. (Ozaukee-Washington),
May 10, 1991, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Id. at B2.
4. Id. at B1.
5. Nancy Mersereau, State Sides with Bret. Lifetime Disability Payment Gets Initial Ap-
proval, OZAUKEE PREss, June 13, 1991, § 3, at 1.
6. See Anthony Bale, Medicolegal Stress at Work, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 399, 413-16 (1990).
7. See Jimmy P. Mann & John Neece, Workers' Compensation for Law Enforcement Re-
lated Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 BmAv. Sci. & L. 447, 452 (1990).
8. Id. at 447.
9. See 1B ARTHuR LARSON, Tim LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.25(a) (1991
& Supp. 1992). Larson explains that, absent a few exceptions, "all of the successful stress
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mental illness, absent a physical component, as a compensable injury.10
This has resulted in an explosion of work-related stress claims
nationwide.'
Although mental illnesses have gained greater recognition in recent
years, they are still treated with skepticism. 2 A diagnosis of the mind,
unlike an examination of a physical condition of the body, is often criti-
cized as being less than an "exact science."' 3 This criticism has been
most recently directed toward PTSD.14 Due to its classification as a dis-
tinct clinical entity and its accompanying objective criteria, attorneys
cases date from 1971 or later." Id. The exceptions include: Butler v. District Parking Manage-
ment Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (involving schizophrenic reaction after 20 years as a
parking lot attendant); American Nat'l Red Cross v. Hagen, 327 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1964)
(awarding benefits to claimant who developed schizophrenia due to the stress he endured at
Red Cross); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105 (Mich. 1960) (awarding benefits
to employee for mental injuries caused by foreman's harassment). It should be noted that
"workers' compensation," instead of "worker's compensation" or "workmen's compensa-
tion," will be used throughout this article, unless otherwise specified by the source.
10. 1B LARSON, supra note 9, § 42.25(c). Presently, 29 states allow some form of compen-
sation for mental injuries unaccompanied by a physical component. Id. Although some of
these states have adopted additional requirements for compensation, all of the states have at
least passed this threshold. Id. The states include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. Id.
11. Id. § 42.25(a). Larson notes that in California, where the most liberal approach to
compensation for mental injuries has been adopted, the number of stress cases increased from
1282 in 1980 to 6812 in 1986. Id. A study published by the California Workers' Compensation
Institute in 1988 indicated that the actual number of claims may be 10 times higher and that
they may account for 17% of all lost-time injuries. Id.; see also Peter S. Barth, Workers' Com-
pensation for Mental Stress Cases, 8 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 349, 358 (1990); Thomas S. Cook, Work-
ers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 879, 895 (1987); Eric H. Marcus, The Anatomy of Litigation Involving Mental
Distress, TRAUMA, Aug. 1988, at 13; Fred J. Pompeani, Mental Stress and Ohio Workers' Com-
pensation: When Is a Stress-Related Condition Compensable?, 40 Citv. ST. L. REv. 35, 36
(1992); Derik R. Girdwood, Comment, Can I Collect Workers' Compensation Benefits If My
Job Drives Me Crazy?, 1992 DET. C.L. REv. 591, 596; Victoria L. Ruhga, Comment, Mental
Stress and Workers' Compensation in Nebraska, 69 NEB. L. REv. 842, 843 n.3 (1990); Nancy
Blodgett, Legal Relief from Tension: Work-Induced Stress Spurs Workers' Comp Claims,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 17, 17 (indicating that stress claims represented only 4.7% of the
nation's occupational disease cases in 1980, but more than doubled in the following three
years); Lawrence P. Postol & Mary W. Adelman, Stress Claims in the Workplace, FOR DEF.,
Aug. 1990, at 5, 5.
12. See Cook, supra note 11, at 880.
13. See Sara J. Sersland, Mental Disability Caused by Mental Stress: Standards of Proof in
Workers' Compensation Cases, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 751, 752-53 (1983-84).
14. See generally David Faust & Jay Ziskin, Challenging Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Claims, 38 DEF. L.J. 407 (1989); Landy F. Sparr & James K. Boehnlein, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder in Tort Actions: Forensic Minefield, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHiA RY & L. 283
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have used its versatility in a variety of contexts.' 5 As PTSD claims in-
crease, the controversy surrounding its validity continues to divide both
legal and medical communities.
In addition to the academic debate, tax-paying citizens often express
discontent with the toll workers' compensation claims exact on the com-
munity. 6 Addressing these concerns, courts throughout the nation have
constructed schemes to limit the splurge of stress-related claims.I Wis-
consin's adoption of the "unusual stress" test is one such limit."8 Under
this approach, an employee's mental condition resulting from either a
single incident or gradual environmental exposure is compensable only if
the stressor producing the condition is "unusual."' 9 Thus, the diagnosis
of any mental disease, including PTSD, will not be compensable unless it
arises from unusual circumstances.
A problem arises in assessing PTSD, which by definition is a condi-
tion brought about by an event "outside the range of usual human expe-
rience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone."20
Under this definition, compensation of all verifiable work-related PTSD
claims would seem to be allowed, particularly those resulting from law
enforcement activities. In spite of PTSD's medical definition, however,
the stressor producing the illness must still meet the legal test of "unusu-
alness."'" Courts continually grapple with the meaning of unusual. Is
(1990); Paul R. Lees-Haley, Pseudo Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, TRiAL DIPL. J., Winter
1986, at 17.
15. See Michael M. Duran, Comment, Nothing New: Unwrapping the Packaging of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 33 Loy. L. REv. 1076, 1077 (1988); see also Eric H. Marcus, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder: Facts and Myths, TRAUMA, Dec. 1990, at 49, 51 (discussing other
contexts in which PTSD occurs, such as rape).
16. See, e.g., Matt Devine, Payouts for Duty Disability Challenged, MiLWAUKEE J., June
23, 1991, at B1 (citizens express discontent with Wisconsin's system that pays 80% of a dis-
abled public safety employee's former salary).
17. Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 452.
18. See School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis. 2d
370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974). In School District No. 1, the court set forth the following test:
[M]ental injury nontraumatically caused must have resulted from a situation of greater
dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must
experience. Only if the "fortuitous event unexpected and unforeseen" can be said to be
so out of the ordinary from the countless emotional strains and differences that em-
ployees encounter daily without serious mental injury will liability under ch. 102, Stats.,
be found.
Id. at 377-78, 215 N.W.2d at 377.
19. See Jenson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 161 Wis. 2d 253, 268-69, 468 N.W.2d 1, 7
(1991).
20. AmnnsCAN PsYcIATRc AS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-mI-R 250, 250-51 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
21. See Jenson, 161 Wis. 2d at 268, 468 N.W.2d at 7. The court stated:
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the environmental stressor compared to the stressors of everyday life, or
simply those stressors arising within that particular occupation? Wiscon-
sin case law provides only a partial answer. The stress is to be compared
to employees within the same occupation.22 This response leaves several
questions unanswered. How are employees in unusually stressful occu-
pations, such as law enforcement, to be compensated for mental illness?
Further, how are employees within the same high stress occupation, but
employed in entirely different environments, to be compensated? For
example, should a police officer employed in a small town with relatively
few violent crimes be compared to a police officer in a large city inun-
dated with violent crime?
These are the most recent issues confronting courts nationwide. Due
to the relatively few workers' compensation cases dealing primarily with
police stress, much confusion exists as to whether police personnel may
be compensated for stress-related injuries.23 Applying Wisconsin's unu-
sual stress test to situations where high stress is "normal" could result in
an elimination of valid claims. Thus, although the courts have recently
clarified the unusual stress test to determine that the comparison be
within the particular occupation, the test needs further adaptation to ad-
dress the compensability of mental disability in high stress occupations.
This Comment will address the prevalence of stress in law enforce-
ment professions and the increased exposure to violent environmental
stressors in those professions. Specifically, the discussion will focus on
the significant growth of PTSD claims in public safety professions. An
analysis of the recent development of the unusual stress test in Wiscon-
sin's workers' compensation system will also be addressed. Finally, a
proposal, as applied to law enforcement related PTSD cases, will be
presented that clarifies the meaning of "unusual" in the context of high
stress occupations.
The injury must be an egregious one that is to be tested not by the severity of the
distress or disabling manifestations but by the severity or traumatizing likelihood of the
particular causative circumstances of employment. It is not an 'injury' no matter how
disabling unless it arises from unusual occupational stresses.
Id.
22. See Probst v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 153 Wis. 2d 185, 191, 450 N.W.2d 478,
480 (Ct. App. 1989). The court's holding, although not clearly stated, indicated that the Com-
mission was correct in comparing the employee's situation with that of other "similarly situ-
ated" employees, rather than focusing on the nature and magnitude of the stresses and strains
endured by the claimant alone. Id.
23. Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 448.
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II. STRESS ARISING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OCCUPATIONS
Recently, stress in the workplace has become the object of considera-
ble attention, both from the perspective of the employer and the la-
borer.24 The media's devotion to the issue has resulted in its recognition
as a nationwide problem. 5 Experts cite several reasons for the increase
in workplace stress, not the least of which includes the increased compli-
cations of contemporary life.26 Advances in technology leading to a
faster-paced society, the decline in family support systems, and the re-
cent augmentation of domestic and community violence serve as addi-
tional burdens on today's worker.27 However, regardless of the causes
of workplace stress, its effects are frequently devastating?8
Nowhere is this more true than in the area of law enforcement.
Police work is widely recognized by the courts and the legislature as in-
herently more stressful than most occupations.29 This is evidenced by
provisions within disability statutes creating a presumption of work-
relatedness in cases of physical injuries, such as heart attacks. °
Although studies indicate that police officers are trained to re-
spond nonemotionally to dangerous environmental stressors, 31
24. William C. Nugent, When Employees Seek Workers' Compensation for Stress, 14 EM-
PLOYEE REL LI. 239, 239 (1988).
25. See id.
26. Ruhga, supra note 11, at 843. Reasons for the increase in mental stress claims include:
(1) the inherent difficulty arising in contemporary life and the prevalence of industrialized
workplaces, (2) the efforts of industrial psychologists to increase the awareness of stress at
work, (3) the increase in two-wage earner families, (4) the advances in medical technology
allowing us to better understand mental injuries, and (5) the disappearance of the stigma
associated with mental illness. Id.; see also Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17 (indicating that
contemporary life is more stressful).
27. See Blodgett, supra note 11, at 17; Ruhga, supra note 11, at 843.
28. See Pompeani, supra note 11, at 36 (indicating that mental injuries are often more
harmful than physical injuries).
29. Bale, supra note 6, at 413; Nancy Norvell et al., Perceived Stress Levels and Physical
Symptoms in Supervisory Law Enforcement Personnel, 16 J. PoLICE Sci. & ADMnN. 75, 75
(1988). But see Richard H. Anson & Mary E. Bloom, Police Stress in an Occupational Con-
text, 16 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 231, 231 (1988) (reporting that there is little evidence show-
ing that police work is more stressful than other jobs).
30. Norvell et al., supra note 29, at 75. Job stress has been implicated as the cause of
several physical illnesses in police officers, including "cardiovascular diseases, digestive dys-
functions (for example, ulcers, colitis, indigestion), hemorrhoids, headaches, and hyperten-
sion." Id. Studies conducted among professional occupations revealed that law enforcement
personnel rank highest in heart disease and have an increased risk of mortality for cancer. Id.
31. John G. Stratton, Traumatic Incidents and the Police, POLICE STREss, Spring 1983, at 4,
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reality reveals that mental illness is pervasive among law enforcement
officers.32
The adverse consequences of such mental diseases on an officer's
well-being include an increased number of divorces, disruption of family
life, alcoholism, and suicide.33 Stress may manifest itself in virtually any
type of physical disorder as well, including "every ailment from head-
aches and sinus attacks to shrinking thalmuses, spastic colons, and grind-
ing teeth. '34 Further, the societal effect of mental stress is demonstrated
in performance anxieties, excessive aggression, police malpractice, and
increased citizen complaints.35
In addition to the complications of contemporary life, which are
problematic in any profession, several environmental stressors unique to
police work are implicated as triggers to the onset of an officer's mental
illness. Law enforcement officers engage in a continual battle between
freedom and domination by societal controls.3 6 Employed in a profes-
sion continually monitored by the media and inundated with strict legal
restrictions, police officers often perceive their job challenges as insur-
mountable. 7 Psychologists indicate that the probability of failure on the
force is high because "many crimes are never solved, many criminals not
apprehended, and many cases plea bargained or dismissed in court. '38
Media images emphasizing the strength, heroic efforts, and power of po-
lice officers often result in the suppression of an officer's emotional re-
leases that are necessary to confront traumatic events.39
32. See Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 448. Based on a 1980 study of the 130 most
common jobs in Tennessee, police officers developed mental illness more frequently than em-
ployees in other occupations. Id.
33. John P. Crank & Michael Caldero, The Production of Occupational Stress in Medium-
Sized Police Agencies: A Survey of Line Officers in Eight Municipal Departments, 19 J. CnnA.
JusT. 339,339 (1991); W. Clinton Terry III, Police Stress: The Empirical Evidence, 9 J. POLICE
Sci. & ADMIN. 61, 67 (1981); see also Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 448 (discussing the
suicide rate of police officers in Tennessee). For a discussion of the prevalence of suicide in
law enforcement officers, see John M. Violanti, Stress Patterns in Police Work: A Longitudinal
Study, 11 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 211, 211 (1983) (survey indicates that among professional
occupations, such as lawyers, physicians, and professors, police officers ranked twice as high in
the number of suicides). A 1976 study of New York police officers revealed that in one year,
1500 police officers required psychiatric care for stress problems and that police compensation
claims were six times the rate of other occupations. Id.
34. Crank & Caldero, supra note 33, at 339 (citation omitted).
35. Terry, supra note 33, at 67.
36. Violanti, supra note 33, at 211.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 211-12.
39. See Stratton, supra note 31, at 5.
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Although every law enforcement officer is confronted with these
stressors, the manifestation of a mental illness will vary in form and mag-
nitude depending on the social and psychological attributes of the indi-
vidual.4° Regardless of the subjectivity of mental illness, discussions of
police stress have focused on four general categories of stressors: (1) ex-
ternal, (2) internal, (3) task-related, and (4) individual.41 External stres-
sors include disillusionment with the justice system as a whole,
particularly the perceived leniency of court decisions, negative media
coverage, and disapproval of decisions arising out of government and
administrative bodies.42 Internal stressors encompass departmental
problems, ranging from poor police training and below-average equip-
ment to unclear reward incentives and career development guidelines.43
Task-related stressors include traditional problems erroneously viewed
as the most frequent source of stress on the job, such as fear, danger of
physical harm, exposure to the violence, and unmanageable work
loads.44 Individual stressors embrace an officer's personal fears regard-
ing individual performance and success. 45
Interestingly, contrary to the widely held notion that the majority of
police stress arises out of exposure to a dangerous environment, studies
reveal that the most frequent source of an officer's stress arises from
internal departmental decisions, not task-related or "street" stress.46
This result can be attributed to the desensitization and emotional detach-
ment officers develop as a coping mechanism.47 Police officers view vio-
lence and death in a different fight than most individuals, and thus,
danger is considered part of the everyday job.48
Whereas organizational stressors occur as the most "frequent" source
of stress, those events continually described as "most stressful" include
task-related stressors such as violent situations and the use of force.49
Experiencing the violent death of a partner, being dismissed from duty,
40. Violanti, supra note 33, at 211.
41. Terry, supra note 33, at 61.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 64 n.5; see also Crank & Caldero, supra note 33, at 342. In a survey of eight
municipal police departments in Illinois, more than two-thirds of all officers identified organi-
zational issues as the primary source of stress. Id. at 343. Officers cited problems relating to
superiors most frequently, with shift changes identified as the second most frequently cited
stressor. Id. at 339. Occupational danger was the least cited stressor. Id.
47. Terry, supra note 33, at 64.
48. Id.
49. See Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 449.
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taking a life in the line of duty, shooting someone in the line of duty, and
coping with the suicide of an officer who is a close friend are routinely
ranked as the most stressful events encountered by law enforcement of-
ficers.50 Considering the nature of the most stressful law enforcement
situations, the likelihood of police officers developing a mental illness
may be greater than in most occupations.5
The recent flood of cases across the country evincing mental illness
due to task-related stressors is a clear indication of the toll environmen-
tal stress has taken on the public safety profession. Issues involving the
dismissal of officers for engaging in criminal conduct have arisen in sev-
eral states. In Pennsylvania, two dismissals of Philadelphia police of-
ficers were changed to medical discharges due to work-related insanity. 2
In the 1986 case Civil Service Commission v. Dillon,5 3 the officer, a para-
noid schizophrenic, was medically discharged after he shot and wounded
two people. 4 One year later, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
decided Perry v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission.5 A police of-
ficer, suffering from mental illness due to job stress, threatened to kill
the police commissioner. 6 The Perry court determined the case to be
similar to Dillon and awarded medical benefits. 7
The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized the implications of
mental illness due to task-related stressors in City of Aurora v. Industrial
Commission.58 There, a police officer was awarded workers' compensa-
tion for PTSD due to his work as an undercover narcotics agent.5 9 The
officer testified that the danger he endured during every narcotics trans-
action, which often forced him to sample the drugs he was buying, re-
sulted in the use of drugs while off-duty and the eventual development
of a mental illness.
60
50. James D. Sewell, The Development of a Critical Life Events Scale for Law Enforce-
ment, 11 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 109, 113 (1983); see also Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 449
(indicating that fatal shooting incidents and being called to the scene of a battered child rank
as extremely stressful).
51. See Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 449.
52. See Perry v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 529 A.2d 616 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987);
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Dillon, 518 A.2d 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), appeal dismissed, 527
A.2d 1007 (1987).
53. 518 A.2d 869 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
54. Id. at 870.
55. 529 A.2d 616 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
56. Id. at 617.
57. Id. at 618.
58. 710 P.2d 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
59. Id. at 1124.
60. Id. at 1122-23.
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Many states have recognized the compensability of mental disabili-
ties arising from occupational dangers, regardless of whether the illness
led to the commission of a crime. In 1988, in one of New York's most
publicized police cases, an officer was granted compensation for stress-
related mental illness arising from his work as an undercover investiga-
tor and decoy.61 He participated in over 1500 arrests during his sixteen-
year career and had numerous dangerous encounters with drug dealers,
including one encounter in which he was forced to inject heroin at
gunpoint.62
Recently, Pennsylvania courts have given the issue of PTSD claims a
substantial amount of consideration. 63 In 1987, in Globe Security Sys-
tems Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,' a liquor store se-
curity guard's widow was awarded workers' compensation benefits after
her husband shot a robbery suspect, suffered an immediate psychotic
episode, and then shot himself.6" Three years later, in City of Scranton v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,66 the court awarded benefits to
a widow of a police officer who committed suicide as a result of the
stress arising out of his assignment to investigate a serial killer.67 In
1991, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decided Squilla v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board.68 In Squilla, a police officer
was reprimanded, both orally and in a department report, for his unsatis-
factory performance. 69 After the reprimand, the officer developed a
mental disability.7" Although the court conceded that his illness was
work-related, it denied benefits because the departmental stressors were
not unusual for "that kind of job."'" Squilla varies from previous cases
because the claim involved organizational, rather than task-related
stressors.
61. See Bale, supra note 6, at 415 (citing After Mental Collapse, Officer Sues for Pension,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1988, at 28).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Squilla v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 606 A.2d 539 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1991); City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 583 A.2d 852 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1154 (1991); Globe See. Sys. Co. v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd., 520 A.2d 545 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987), affd, 544 A.2d 953 (1988).
64. 520 A.2d 545 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
65. Id. at 546.
66. 583 A.2d 852 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
67. Id. at 856.
68. 606 A.2d 539 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
69. Id. at 540.
70. Id. at 541.
71. Id. at 543.
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Although Wisconsin courts are likely to face similar cases in upcom-
ing years, there has been only one published case concerning the mental
disability of a police officer caused by stress of employment.72 In Village
of Random Lake v. Labor & Industry Review Commission,73 the court of
appeals considered the case of a one-man police department. The of-
ficer, required to work up to eighty or ninety hours per week, filed a
claim for disability benefits due to chronic depression and anxiety disor-
der.74 Although the court did not decide whether the officer's situation
warranted compensation, it remanded the case with instructions to apply
the appropriate unusual stress standard when deciding the police of-
ficer's case.75
The studies involving police stress and the recent flood of mental dis-
ability cases, particularly those involving PTSD, indicate that stress in
law enforcement is increasing. In light of this evidence and the
probability of facing similar decisions, Wisconsin courts require a clear
understanding of the stress endured by law enforcement officers and of
the unique aspects of the frequently occurring mental illness, PTSD.
III. TiE DEVELOPMENT OF PTSD IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
A. History and Recognition of PTSD
PTSD is a psychological disturbance that originates in response to an
event that is "outside the range of usual human experience and that
would be markedly distressing to almost anyone. '76 The overwhelming
encounter usually involves a serious threat or harm to one's life or physi-
cal integrity.77 The American Psychiatric Association specifically recog-
nized PTSD as a distinct clinical entity in 1980 and incorporated its
diagnostic criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
72. Although only one published decision exists, in 1991 the Labor and Industry Review
Commission did decide this issue at the administrative level. See Nelis v. City of Racine Police
Dep't, No. 81-068636, 1991 WL 477077 (Wis. Labor Ind. Review Comm'n, May 6, 1991). In
Nelis, a police officer applied for disability benefits after developing post-traumatic stress dis-
order as a result of the physical injuries and assaults he incurred on the job. Id. at *3. The
Labor & Industry Review Commission affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
awarding the applicant duty disability benefits for his work-related injury. Id. at *1-2.
73. 141 Wis. 2d 559, 415 N.W.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1987).
74. Id. at 561-62, 415 N.W.2d at 578.
75. Id. at 565, 415 N.W.2d at 580. The court did not address the merits of the case, but
held that Wisconsin's unusual stress test for worker's compensation cases applied to duty disa-
bility pension cases as well. Id.
76. DSM-III-R, supra note 20, at 250-51.
77. Id.
[Vol. 77:147
THE UNUSUAL STRESS TEST
orders (DSM-lII-R).Y8 This official recognition resulted in an explosion
of publicity, both favorable and negative, regarding the concept of
trauma and stress. 79
The discovery of PTSD arose from studies of victims of war, particu-
larly Vietnam veterans.8 0 Commonly known as "shell shock," soldiers
re-experienced the trauma of combat well after the war was over, some
suffering its effects for the rest of their lives.81 Postwar America wit-
nessed the reality of psychological trauma as manifested in the nervous
condition of returning veterans, including flashbacks of the war, night-
mares, paralysis, stammering, and general irritableness.82 Due to the
consciousness-raising efforts of veteran groups, the medical community
acknowledged PTSD as a new category of mental disorders that could be
found throughout society.83
PTSD, "the only psychiatric disorder defined in part by an environ-
mental event,"' is estimated to occur in one-third to one-half of all civil-
ians exposed to life-threatening trauma.8 5 Although almost "any
environmentally-induced trauma which poses a realistic threat to life or
physical integrity can precipitate PTSD," 6 those events frequently pro-
78. See C.B. SCRIGNAR, PosT-TRAunATIc STRESS DISORDER: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT,
AND LEGAL IssuEs 1, 7-9 (2d ed. 1988). In 1974, a committee on Anxiety and Dissociative
Disorders worked together for several years to decide on a system of classification for anxiety
disorders. Id. at 7-8. In 1980, PTSD was included as a distinct category in the third edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R). Id. at 8; see also April
Harlton, Comment, The Compensability of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Under Oklahoma
Workers' Compensation Laws, 25 TULSA LJ. 815, 818 n.29 (1990) (indicating that the DSM-
II-R is recognized as a primary source for psychiatric diagnosis).
79. SCRIGNAR, supra note 78, at 1.
80. Bennett Olshaker, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Not Just War Veterans, TRAuMA,
Apr. 1991, at 75, 75.
81. JuDrrH L. HERMAN, TRAuMA AND RECOVERY 20-21 (1992).
82. Id. at 22-23. Herman quotes the writing of a survivor of the First World War:
Shell Shock. How many a brief bombardment had its long-delayed after-effect in the
minds of these survivors, many of whom had looked at their companions and laughed
while inferno did its best to destroy them. Not then was their evil hour; but now; now in
the sweating suffocation of nightmare, in the paralysis of limbs, in the stammering of
dislocated speech. Worst of all, in the disintegration of those qualities through which
they had been so gallant and selfless and uncomplaining-this, in the finer types of
men, was the unspeakable tragedy of shell-shock ....
Id. at 23.
83. Id. at 27-28.
84. Ari Kiev, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The Unrecognized Syndrome, TRLAL, Mar.
1988, at 62, 62.
85. Herbert Hendin, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Psychiatrist Discusses the Ramift-
cations of Life-Threatening Trauma, TRIAL, Feb. 1987, at 63, 63.
86. SCRIGNAR, supra note 78, at 60.
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ducing trauma include car accidents, industrial accidents, the ingestion
or absorption of chemical substances, criminal or sexual assaults, terror-
ism, natural or man-made disasters, and disaster site rescuesY Despite
its ubiquity, PTSD only preserves its validity if specific criteria, as deter-
mined by the American Psychiatric Association, are used in the assess-
ment of cases.
B. Characteristics of PTSD in Law Enforcement Officers
The DSM-III-R outlines objective characteristics for evaluating both
the environmental stressor and the symptoms it produces.88 These crite-
87. See id. at 42-60; Kiev, supra note 84, at 62.
88. DSM-III-R, supra note 20, at 250-51. The DSM-III-R sets forth the following criteria
for PTSD:
A. The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human
experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g., serious
threat or harm to one's life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to one's chil-
dren, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one's home or
community or seeing another person who has recently been, or is being seriously in-
jured or killed as a result of an accident or physical violence.
B. The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in at least one of the follow-
ing ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event (in young children,
repetitive play in which themes or aspects of the trauma are experienced)
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were reoccurring (includes a
sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative [flashback]
episodes, even those that occur upon awakening or when intoxicated)
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an
aspect of the traumatic event, including anniversaries of the trauma
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma or numbing of gen-
eral responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by at least three of
the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma
(2) efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections of the trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma (psychogenic amnesia)
(4) markedly diminished interest in significant activities (in young children, loss of re-
cently acquired developmental skills such as toilet training or language skills)
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect, e.g., unable to have loving feelings
(7) sense of foreshortened future, e.g., child does not expect to have a career, mar-
riage, or children, or a long life
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma) as
indicated by at least two of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger
(3) difficulty concentrating
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response
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ria aid attorneys and psychiatrists in assessing PTSD cases.89 In deter-
mining a case's validity, the criteria may be categorized into three
general sources constituting a diagnosis of the illness: the environment,
the perception, and the physical reactionf 0
First, a stressor producing PTSD in its victim arises from the environ-
ment.91 The law enforcement officer, often exposed to dramatic envi-
ronmental stressors, is particularly susceptible to PTSDY2 Stressful
events such as being shot at, shooting or killing someone in the line of
duty, seeing a partner killed, and being physically threatened or having
the officer's family physically threatened, are classified as environmental
stressors capable of producing PTSD.93
After the traumatic event, a mental image of the situation is per-
ceived in the mind of the officer.94 This "imprint" results in visual
images, flashbacks, dreams, and sudden actions, such as hallucinations or
illusions, in response to the event as if it were recurring.95 This widely
known "flashback" phenomena distinguishes PTSD from other anxiety
disorders. 96 In addition to flashbacks, law enforcement officers also suf-
fer feelings of "isolation and alienation from fellow officers," experience
"suspiciousness and mistrust of the public," and often become "overly
cautious in police situations that were once routine.197
(6) physiologic reactivity upon exposure to events that symbolize or resemble an as-
pect of the traumatic event (e.g., a woman who was raped in an elevator breaks out in a
sweat when entering any elevator)
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in B, C, and D) of at least one month.
Id.
89. Harlton, supra note 78, at 818-19.
90. See ScruGNAR, supra note 78, at 16-32. Scrignar refers to the three categories as the
"Three E's": Environment, Encephalic Events, and Endogenous Processes. Id. at 16; see also
Duran, supra note 15, at 1080.
91. SCRIGNAR, supra note 78, at 16.
92. See Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 449-50.
93. Id. In a 1986 study, 53 police officers were questioned about stressful on-the-job ex-
periences. Id. at 449.
Of these 53 officers, 60% reported one or more event that was highly stressful .... Of
these, 32% reported being exposed to three or more violent stressors. Post-traumatic
stress disorder was diagnosed in 26% of the officers due to their encounters with vio-
lence. The percentage reporting PTSD was much higher for those who had encoun-
tered more than one violent stressor.
Id. at 449-50; see also Sewell, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
94. Kiev, supra note 84, at 62.
95. SccNAuRa, supra note 78, at 18.
96. Id.
97. Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 449.
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The final factor of PTSD includes a change in the officer's internal
body functioning. 98 Nervousness, hypervigilance, nausea, dizziness,
trembling, diarrhea, and physical discomfort often arise in the PTSD
victim. 99
These symptoms, if occurring longer than one month, further evi-
dence PTSD.1' A police officer's need for self-control often results in a
lack of early treatment of PTSD, and thus, the symptoms continue long
after the event occurred.101 After the stressful event, the officer may
strive to perform well in future situations. PTSD symptoms often occur
weeks after the initial event because "future stressful events build on top
of the earlier traumatic stress that was not appropriately managed at that
time." 2 Further, re-exposing an officer to the same environment in
which the stressor occurred often results in the development of common
symptoms of PTSD, such as hyperalertness or exaggerated startle
responses. 0 3
Although the DSM-III-R sets forth a structured set of objective crite-
ria to facilitate evaluation of the illness, misuse and lack of adherence to
the manual in the courtroom presents a continuing problem."° To en-
sure a valid PTSD diagnosis, several detection measures are available
through advances in the fields of medicine and psychiatry. 0 5
C. Detection of PTSD
Due to its relatively new introduction into the world of psychiatric
illnesses, critics of PTSD often claim the DSM-III-R contains a lack of
"valid diagnostic ratings.' 1 6 Lawyers may be tempted to use the DSM-
III-R charts as a "checklist," ignoring that the manual was designed for
clinical research and not necessarily to ensure that all legal requirements
for mental disease are met.' 7 Further, when the DSM-III-R is in the
hands of inexperienced individuals, "the apparent ease at arriving at a
98. SCRIGNAR, supra note 78, at 20-21. Scrignar describes the change in internal body
functioning as endogenous events. Id. at 20. The anxiety the victim feels precipitates the
uncomfortable feelings. Id.
99. Id.; see also Kiev, supra note 84, at 62.
100. See DSM-III-R, supra note 20, at 250-51.
101. See Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 450.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Sparr & Boehnlein, supra note 14, at 283, 290.
105. Harlton, supra note 78, at 820.
106. Sparr & Boehnlein, supra note 14, at 291.
107. See id. at 290.
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diagnosis gives a false sense of security." ' Therefore, the use of exper-
ienced expert witnesses may aid in the interpretation of the relevant
categories.
Psychological testing has been developed in an attempt to objectify
the individual's feelings. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
tory Test is one such test that may detect fraudulent claims." 9 A newer
test, known as the "Impact of Event Scale," is an examination of the
victim's feelings and a method to determine the severity of the illness.110
Other recently developed tests are designed to measure the validity or
exaggeration of the individual's symptoms."'
Regardless of an objective set of criteria or psychological testing, the
issue of causation continues to haunt medical and legal personnel. De-
bates rage among plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys regarding the es-
tablishment of a causal connection between the mental disorder and the
work-related stressor."12 In order to determine that other events, such
as those associated with personal or family life are not causative of the
illness, a showing that "a specific event occurred at work immediately
preceding the manifestation of mental harm" serves to establish the req-
uisite cause." 3
A valid diagnosis of PTSD and the establishment of a work-related
cause is only half of an officer's battle. In order to gain compensation
for a mental illness in Wisconsin, the employee must meet the unusual
stress test as well." 4
108. Id. at 291.
109. Marcus, supra note 15, at 52; Harlton, supra note 78, at 820.
110. Harlton, supra note 78, at 820.
111. See Marcus, supra note 15, at 52-53.
112. See Harlton, supra note 78, at 821.
113. Id.
114. See infra notes 145-90 and accompanying text. Although Wisconsin recognizes
PTSD as a compensable injury, no published case has analyzed the illness in the context of
police work, or any other unusually stressful environment. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Labor &
Indus. Review Comm'n, 173 Wis. 2d 700,495 N.W.2d 660 (1993) (Where employee's co-work-
ers intentionally harassed him by making unexpected noises, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed an order of the Labor and Industry Review Commission to award benefits for the
aggravation of his pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder he developed as a result of mili-
tary service in Vietnam.), affg 166 Wis. 2d 830, 480 N.W.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1992).
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IV. COMPENSATION OF MENTAL INJURIES IN WISCONSIN'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION SYSTEM
A. Overview of Workers' Compensation and Mental Injury
The workers' compensation system arose out of an effort to provide
medical and cash benefits for employees suffering from injuries incurred
during the course of employment." 5 Differing in two respects from the
conventional damage suit, workers' compensation actions eliminate fault
on the part of the employer and grant payments according to a schedule
based on the employee's injury, rather than on damages inherent to the
traditional personal injury lawsuit." 6 In Wisconsin, as in most states, an
employer is liable for the employee's injury if, at the time the employee
suffers an injury, the employee is performing job-related tasks." 7 Pro-
vided that the injury arose by accident," 8 employees are compensated
for their injuries as well as loss of wage-earning ability." 9 An em-
ployee's remedy is exclusive, however, because an additional action in
tort against the employer is prohibited. 20 Thus, the burden of paying an
employee's benefits is placed on the employer because the employer is
in the best position to absorb the financial responsibility by ultimately
passing the cost on to consumers.
115. 1B LARSON, supra note 9, § 1.00; see also Girdwood, supra note 11, at 593.
116. See 1B LARSON, supra note 9, § 1.10.
117. See Wis. STAT. § 102.03(1) (1991-92). The statute lists the conditions for liability:
Liability under this chapter shall exist against an employer only where the following
conditions occur:
(a) Where the employe sustains an injury.
(b) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer and employe are subject to the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) 1. Where, at the time of the injury, the employe is performing service growing out
of and incidental to his or her employment.
Id.
118. Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2)(c) (1991-92) requires that the injury be caused by accident.
The statute defines "injury" as:
[M]ental or physical harm to an employe caused by accident or disease, and also means
damage to or destruction of artificial members, dental appliances, teeth, hearing aids
and eyeglasses, but, in the case of hearing aids or eyeglasses, only if such damage or
destruction resulted from accident which also caused personal injury entitling the em-
ploye to compensation therefor either for disability or treatment.
Id.
119. Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 451.
120. See Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2) (1991-92), which states in part, "Where such conditions
exist the right to the recovery of compensation under this chapter shall be the exclusive rem-
edy against the employer, any other employe of the same employer and the worker's compen-
sation insurance carrier."
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The most recent workers' compensation litigation surrounds claims
for psychological and mental disability caused by job-related stress.121
Stress claims are traditionally divided into three categories: mental-phys-
ical, physical-mental, and mental-mental."2 In a mental-physical claim,
the worker alleges that a work-related mental stimulus, such as a sudden
fright, results in a physical injury."z A physical-mental claim involves a
physical injury that results in a prolonged disability due to the em-
ployee's emotional stress surrounding the trauma.124 Both mental-physi-
cal and physical-mental claims are uniformly held to be compensable.125
However, mental-niental cases, also known as "stress claims,"1 26 con-
tinue to divide workers' compensation courts nationwide. In these cases,
workplace stress produces a mental illness, such as PTSD. Unlike
mental illnesses arising from a physical trauma, or physical injuries re-
sulting from a mental stimulus, mental injuries absent a physical compo-
nent continually fight for recognition. 2 7
The recent deluge of cases flooding the system necessitates treating
stress claims with apprehension.'2 Stress cases raise several societal
problems. First, the possibility of feigning an injury is often greater in
the context of psychological injuries than in physical injury cases.129 Ma-
lingerers, those who feign injuries in order to avoid their employment
responsibilities, present a danger to their employers, the workers' com-
pensation system, and society as a whole. 30 Second, the inherent suspi-
cion as to the validity of psychological diagnosis is justified since many
methods of detection and evaluation are relatively new.' 3' Third, con-
sidering that no two individuals maintain the same emotional strength,
attempts to objectify an inherently subjective reaction will always pres-
ent a problem. 32 Finally, there is the long-standing fear of creating a life
121. See lB LARSON, supra note 9, § 42.25(a) ("The most lively development in compen-
sation law in the last 15 years has been the explosion of 'stress claims."').
122. Id. Larson states, "The cases may be thought of, for convenience, in three groups:
mental stimulus causing physical injury; physical trauma causing nervous injury; and mental
stimulus causing nervous injury." Id. § 42.20.
123. Id. § 42.21(a), 42.21(b).
124. Id. § 42.22(a).
125. Id. §§ 42.21(b), 42.22(a).
126. Id. § 42.25(a).
127. See id. § 42.23.
128. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
129. Postol & Adelman, supra note 11, at 6.
130. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 34.
131. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
132. See Pompeani, supra note 11, at 51.
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and health insurance system out of the Worker's Compensation Act.'33
The central conflict underlying each of these arguments is the struggle
between two important competing interests: the judiciary's recognition
of legislative intent to liberally construe compensation statutes and the
public's desire to impose limits on their application. 34
In light of these competing considerations, different states have cre-
ated schemes designed to separate the valid from the fraudulent claims.
States generally fall into four different categories regarding their analysis
of mental-mental cases. 35 The first category consists of states presently
denying liability for any mental injury case caused solely by stress. 36 In
these jurisdictions, a mental injury absent a physical cause or result is not
compensated.
Second, "sudden stimulus" states offer narrow compensability by rec-
ognizing a mental-mental claim only if the cause of the mental injury is
surprising and unanticipated. 37 If the employee can link a sudden or
frightening event to the development of a mental illness, compensation
benefits will be awarded.
A third test, offering the broadest coverage, compensates psychologi-
cal illnesses in virtually the same manner as physical injuries.138 Com-
monly regarded as the "causation" test,139 it affords compensation to an
employee, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the injury, as
133. See Bale, supra note 6, at 410; Cook, supra note 11, at 879.
134. See Cook, supra note 11, at 879.
135. 1B LARSON, supra note 9, § 42.25(b). Larson sets forth four categories of coverage
for mental injuries:
Group One: mental stimulus producing mental injury is compensable even if gradual,
and even if the stress is not unusual by comparison with that of ordinary life or
employment.
Group Two: "mental-mental" cases are compensable even if gradual, but only if the
stress is unusual.
Group Three: "mental-mental" cases are compensable, but only if the stimulus is
sudden.
Group Four. "mental-mental" cases are never compensable, whether gradual or sud-
den; there must be some physical component in the injury.
Id.
136. Id. § 42.25(d). Eight states have ruled out compensability for any type of mental
injury: Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
Id.
137. Id. § 42.25(e). Eight states, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington, adhere to the sudden stimulus test. Id.
138. See id. § 42.25(g).
139. See, e.g., George W. Dawes, Eligibility for Worker's Compensation in Cases of Non-
traumatic Mental Injury: The Development of the Unusual Stress Test in Wisconsin, 1987 Wis.
L. REv. 363, 364.
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long as the work-related stress caused the mental illness. 140 Injuries re-
sulting from long-term stress or ordinary pressures are compensated. 141
The final test, as developed in Wisconsin, is the unusual stress test. 42
The unusual stress test embraces a middle position between the limited
sudden stimulus test and the broad causation test. An injury resulting
from either gradual stress or a specific event will be compensated only
when the stressor is unusual. The factors defining "unusual" vary from
state to state. 43
Although a forerunner in the development of this seemingly straight-
forward test, Wisconsin has yet to determine the impact of the unusual
stress test in high stress occupations. 44 The meaning of "unusual" is
fraught with confusion and complications. A workable standard that
clarifies the term is necessary to resolve the interpretative problems in-
herent in the courts and the legislature. Before proposing a revised test,
a background of Wisconsin's case law is necessary to evaluate its current
interpretation.
B. The Development of the Unusual Stress Test in Wisconsin
In 1974, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first articulated the unusual
stress test in the landmark case School District No. 1 v. Department of
Industry, Labor & Human Relations.'4 5 The claimant, a high school gui-
dance counselor, alleged an acute anxiety reaction after discovering a
note submitted by the students requesting her removal from the staff.' 46
Conceding that Wisconsin recognizes mental injuries, the court em-
barked on an analysis of whether her injury met the "accident" require-
ment. 47 In defining accident in terms of whether "the cause was of an
accidental character or if the effect was the unexpected result of routine
performance of the claimant's duties," the court expressly stated that
"accident" does not encompass every event that occurs during the time
the employee is performing services related to his or her employment.148
140. 1B LARSON, supra note 9, § 42.25(g).
141. See Dawes, supra note 139, at 365.
142. 1B LARSON, supra note 9, § 42.25(f). Larson commends Wisconsin for maintaining a
straightforward approach to dealing with unusual stress cases arising from gradual stress. Id.
§ 42.23(b).
143. See id. § 42.25(f).
144. See supra note 114.
145. 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974).
146. Id. at 371, 215 N.W.2d at 374.
147. Id. at 373-74, 215 N.W.2d at 375-76.
148. Id. at 375, 215 N.W.2d at 376 (emphasis omitted).
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To prevent opening the "floodgates" to fraudulent claims,149 the
court constructed the present standard: "[M]ental injury nontraumati-
cally caused must have resulted from a situation of greater dimensions
than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees
must experience." 5 0 Although holding that the receipt of a request rec-
ommending her dismissal was not out of the ordinary from the strains
employees encounter daily, the court stated that it did not intend to
close the door to legitimate situations in which compensation may be
warranted.'15
Even though the court's analysis recognized mental claims, a direct
distinction between mental and physical injuries was not drawn. Thus,
two interpretations arose out of this initial test. One view encompassed
the idea that the test was that of a reasonable person: whether a hypo-
thetical average worker without a pre-existing condition would be af-
fected by the unusual circumstances.'52 However, as evidenced by later
cases, another view emerged that interpreted the standard as requiring
only "out-of-the-ordinary" stress as compared to that particular worker's
life.'53 According to this latter view, if an employee contributes a per-
sonal risk such as a pre-existing mental condition, the circumstances
must be unusual to that employee's situation to increase the risk of de-
veloping the illness. It was not until fifteen years later that this more
subjective view was rejected, and the reasonable person interpretation
explicitly adopted.' 4
149. Id. at 377, 215 N.W.2d at 377.
150. Id. at 377-78, 215 N.W.2d at 377.
151. Id. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 377-78.
152. See Sersland, supra note 13, at 772-74. An unusual stress test based on the reason-
able person, or average worker, requires that the stress be of such a degree to cause mental
injury in an average worker. Id. at 773. Often criticized as a departure from the traditional
workers' compensation principle that the employer takes the employee "as is," it is based on
how the stress affects a hypothetical worker, not the individual claimant. Id.
153. Id. In this subjective view, the test does not involve an average worker standard. Id.
Rather, this interpretation questions whether the stress endured by the employee was unusual
for that employee's personal job situation. Id. This view is in keeping with conventional
workers' compensation principles because if job stress aggravates an employee's predisposi-
tion to mental illness, the injury would be compensated. Id. A traditional example involving
physical injuries includes "'idiopathic fall cases,' where an employee falls and hurts himself
because of some nonoccupational ailment such as epilepsy." Id. at 774. Most states require
that an added risk of employment exists, "such as placing him [the employee] on a height or
near moving machinery," in order to award compensation. Id.
154. See Jenson v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 161 Wis. 2d 253, 268, 468 N.W.2d 1, 7
(1991). The Jenson court analyzed the unusual stress test by stating, "It is in a sense an objec-
tive test-would a person of ordinary sensibilities be emotionally injured or mentally dis-
tressed in the absence of the unusual circumstances." Id.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed School District No. 1 and ex-
tended the test to allow compensation for gradual, unusual stress in
Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Rela-
tions.155 The employee, working for a mail-order cheese company, be-
came inundated with pressure attributable to the critical and berating
attitude of her supervisor, the deadlines for purchases and deliveries,
and the unusually long hours. 56 She eventually suffered a schizophrenic
mental breakdown.'57 In assessing her injury, the court refused to ana-
lyze mental injury cases in the same way as physical injuries that develop
over a protracted period of time.'58 Although her injury resulted from
gradual, long-term stress, the court held that it was compensable because
it arose out of unusual circumstances as compared to other employees. 5 9
Swiss Colony's holdings that mental injuries may not be analyzed in the
same manner as physical injuries and that the stress must be compared
to other employees reveals the court's belief that the standard is one of a
reasonable person. Swiss Colony implicitly rejected a subjective inter-
pretation of the test.
The Wisconsin Legislature reacted to the expansion of the test to in-
clude gradual stress by codifying it within the Wisconsin Worker's Com-
pensation Act.' 60 In an attempt to define unusualness, the legislature
amended the definition of "injury" several times during the 1980s. In
1981, an injury included emotional stress arising from conditions "be-
yond those common to daily life.' 1 6 1 This change seemed to broaden the
School District No. 1 standard by comparing the stress endured by an
employee to the strains of everyday life, rather than the strains other
employees experience.' 6 In 1984, another attempt to clarify the lan-
guage was made by modifying the statutory language to define injury as
155. 72 Wis. 2d 46, 240 N.W.2d 128 (1976).
156. Id. at 51-53, 240 N.W.2d at 130-31.
157. Id. at 50, 240 N.W.2d at 130.
158. Id. at 54, 240 N.W.2d at 131-32. The circuit court determined that School District
No. I was not applicable to this case because the stress arose gradually. Id. Rather, the court
held that mental illness arising from gradual stress is identical to an occupational disease. Id.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this contention, and held that physical injuries cannot
be analyzed in the same way as mental injuries. Id. at 55, 240 N.W.2d at 131-32. The court
held that School District No. 1 applies to specific events precipitating mental injuries as well as
injuries resulting from gradual stress. Id. Thus, compensation for mental injuries will only be
awarded if the stress is out of the ordinary. Id.
159. Id. at 51, 240 N.W.2d at 130.
160. See Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2)(c) (1981-82).
161. Id.
162. Dawes, supra note 139, at 368. Stresses common to daily life include pressures "in-
volved in social, recreational, consumer, and family activities." Id. at 368 n.32.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
mental stress arising from conditions "beyond those common to occupa-
tional or nonoccupational life."163 However, this definition contributed
little to the effort to create a workable solution and actually resulted in
additional confusion."6 Thus, in 1988 the legislature removed all refer-
ence to the unusual stress test, thereby leaving in effect the School Dis-
trict No. 1 standard and the interpretation of its language to the
courts.
165
As the legislature attempted to define unusualness, the courts moved
further from School District No. 1 by focusing on the individual em-
ployee's predisposition to illness and the employee's personal situation,
rather than focusing on the unusualness of the circumstances within that
occupation. In International Harvester v. Labor & Industry Review
Commission,'165 an employee developed schizophrenia after witnessing a
co-worker's accident. The co-worker, a close friend of the claimant's,
was splashed with molten metal and severely burned. 67 After the co-
worker died a few days later, the claimant became unable to function
and felt responsible for the tragedy. 68 Although the court conceded
that witnessing an accident at work is often a common experience, this
accident was deemed unique because the deceased was the co-worker's
close friend, and he felt responsible for the death. 69 Thus, in order to
restrict the possibility of limitless claims arising from witnessing an acci-
dent, the court believed that compensation in these cases should be
awarded only for those who were "active participants in the tragedy"
and would feel some responsibility for it.170 Rather than focusing on the
objective stress of the job, the court held that the employee's subjective
reaction to the occurrence merited a finding of "unusualness.''7 De-
parting from the Swiss Colony approach that physical injuries and
mental injuries are distinct, the court reasoned that people who have
predispositions to mental illnesses should be compensated in the same
163. Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2)(c) (1983-84).
164. See S. Res. 457, 88th Leg. (1987) (enacted). This Wisconsin Senate Bill evinces the
confusion that resulted from the statutory definition of mental injury as including the phrase
"if it arises from exposure to conditions or circumstances beyond those common to occupa-
tional or nonoccupational life." Id. The analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau indi-
cated that "this language is ambiguous and has resulted in conflicting court interpretations as
to the comparison to be made. Therefore, this ambiguous language is deleted." Id.
165. Wis. STAT. § 102.01(2)(c) (1987-88).
166. 116 Wis. 2d 298, 341 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1983).
167. Id. at 300, 341 N.W.2d at 722-23.
168. Id. at 301, 341 N.W.2d at 723.
169. Id. at 303, 341 N.W.2d at 724.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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way as those with predispositions to physical injuries. 172 Understanda-
bly, this language resulted in court confusion as to whether the test en-
compassed the reasonable person view or a more subjective view. 7 3
Prior to 1989, two issues remained unanswered: whether the test em-
braced a reasonable person standard, and if so, whether the comparison
was to reasonable people across the broad spectrum of industries, or
simply to a reasonable person within the employee's particular occupa-
tion. In Probst v. Labor & Industry Review Commission,'74 an owner of
a building-supply company experienced anxiety and panic attacks when
the business developed financial problems. At the workers' compensa-
tion hearing, the administrative law judge (A.L.J.) rejected an approach
that considered the nature of the stress the employee alone experienced
and determined that the appropriate test was to compare the stress to
employees "similarly situated."' 75 On appeal, the employee argued that
the test is a subjective one and that the stress was unique to her own
business.1 76 However, the court of appeals adhered to a reasonable per-
son standard. Because financial problems are common in small busi-
nesses, especially in construction industries, her claim for benefits was
rejected. 77
The Probst court affirmed the A.L.J.'s decision and held that only by
measuring an employee's stress with that of other employees in the same
occupation, will it be possible to determine if the event is unusual. 78
However, in affirming the decision, the court relied on the School Dis-
trict No. 1 language, 179 but never explicitly modified it to incorporate the
"similarly situated" interpretation.
172. Id. at 303-04, 341 N.W.2d at 724. The court recognized that the purpose of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act is to compensate employees for injuries and charge the loss to the cost
of production. Id. The court compared an employee's injury to the breakdown of a machine
and stated: "Some people may break down ... most may not. Whether the employer is
blameless for this preconditioned vulnerability is not important. The employer is equally
blameless when a machine breaks down. A misfortune of the industry is part of the burden of
running a business, whether to machine or person." Id. at 304, 341 N.W.2d at 724. Thus, the
court drew no distinction between compensation for physical or mental injuries and held that
compensation should be granted regardless of an employee's preconditioned vulnerability to
mental illness.
173. See S. Res. 457, supra note 164; Dawes, supra note 139, at 370-71; see also Probst v.
Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 153 Wis. 2d 185, 189, 450 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Ct. App. 1989)
(An employee argued that the stress she experienced was unique to her in her business.).
174. 153 Wis. 2d 185, 450 N.W.2d 478 (Ct. App. 1989).
175. Id. at 188-89, 450 N.W.2d at 479.
176. Id. at 191, 450 N.W.2d at 480.
177. Id. at 189, 450 N.W.2d at 479.
178. Id. at 191, 450 N.W.2d at 480.
179. Id. at 190-91, 450 N.W.2d at 480.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The most recent clarification of the test arose in the 1991 case Jenson
v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.'80 Although the primary issue con-
cerned whether an intentional action may be covered under Wisconsin's
Worker's Compensation Act, the court addressed the School District No.
1 standard for mental injuries.181 In Jenson, a village clerk-treasurer al-
leged mental distress as a result of the village president's degrading ver-
bal attacks upon her work performance. 8z The court held that the
harassment fell within the purview of the statute defining mental in-
jury. 83 In clarifying "injury," the court stated that the test is an objec-
tive one that measures the severity of the specific circumstances of the
job, and not the severity of the distress experienced.'" "It is not an 'in-
jury' no matter how disabling unless it arises from unusual occupational
stresses.' 1 85 Jenson, unlike its predecessors, clearly stated that the unu-
sual stress test embraces a reasonable person standard: "It is in a sense
an objective test-would a person of ordinary sensibilities be emotion-
ally injured or mentally distressed in the absence of the unusual
circumstances.' 86
Although Jenson utilized the most straightforward language in inter-
preting the unusual stress test, several problems remain. The current
standard is one of a reasonable person within the employee's occupa-
tional context. However, in arriving at this clarification, the courts con-
tinue to uphold the language found in School District No. 1 that refers to
stress "all employees must experience." The confusion as to the stan-
dard will continue to haunt Wisconsin courts until this language is explic-
itly modified to incorporate stress in the context of similarly situated
employees.
Further, the unusual stress test is often criticized as merely providing
a "badge of reliability," rather than reliability based on factual inquir-
ies.18 7 It is difficult to determine whether the employment was actually
the cause of the mental illness, considering that multiple occupational
and nonoccupational factors often combine to cause the disability."8
Relying on the testimony of co-workers to describe the employment situ-
180. 161 Wis. 2d 253, 468 N.W.2d 1 (1991).
181. Id. at 268-69, 468 N.W.2d at 7-8.
182. Id. at 257-58, 468 N.W.2d at 2-3.
183. Id. at 264, 468 N.W.2d at 8.
184. Id. at 268, 468 N.W.2d at 7.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Sersland, supra note 13, at 783.
188. See id.
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ation may result in inaccurate testimony prompted by dislike of the
claimant.189 However, abandoning this unusual stress threshold would
eliminate the causation test and provide no way to sift out work-related
from nonwork claims. In order to alleviate the above hazards, an effort
to combine independent investigations of the workplace and the testi-
mony of co-workers is necessary to substantiate a claim for mental
injury.
Finally, the application of the unusual stress test to high stress occu-
pations may result in an elimination of genuine claims. When an entire
occupation is subject to unusual stress, the stress endured by a claimant
may be ordinary as compared to others within the same occupation.
This issue has arisen in other states, but is an issue of first impression in
Wisconsin.190 A proposal must be developed to address the compen-
sability of high stress occupations under the unusual stress test.
C. A Proposal for Clarification of the Unusual Stress Test
To clarify Wisconsin's unusual stress test, two steps may be taken.
First, the reasonable person standard as applied to similarly situated em-
ployees should be explicitly recognized by the courts. This would entail
a modification of the School District No. I language. Second, when con-
fronted with a high stress claim, the court should set forth a separate
standard to ensure that valid claims are not eliminated for a lack of un-
189. Letitia J. Mallin, Disease, Not Accident Recognition of Occupational Stress Under
the Workmen's Compensation Laws, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTrL L. 357, 381 (1988).
190. See infra note 191 and accompanying text for examples of states addressing this is-
sue. Wisconsin has never specifically addressed the problem of the compensability of high
stress occupations in workers' compensation. The only published case concerning police of-
ficer mental stress is Village of Random Lake v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 141 Wis. 2d
559, 415 N.W.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1987). Although the court determined that the officer's claim
for mental injury must be analyzed under the unusual stress test, it remanded the case to the
Labor & Industry Review Commission, and therefore no decision on the merits of the case
was reached. Id. at 565-67, 415 N.W.2d at 580. Although the issue was briefly addressed by
the Labor & Industry Review Commission in Nelis v. City of Racine Police Dept., No. 81-
068636, 1991 WL 477077 (Wis. Labor Ind. Review Comm'n, May 6, 1991), the Commission
determined the injury to be linked to the employee's physical injuries, thereby removing it
from the category of nontraumatic mental injuries. Id. at *3. The Commission stated:
As the stress was directly linked to various physical injuries, it is not necessary to make
a finding that the level of stress he sustained while on duty was more than that ordina-
rily found in police work. While each may have been within the definition of ordinary
police work, the number and severity of the episodes overwhelmed his normal coping
mechanism to cause his present stress disorder.
Id. Although the opinion seems to depart from Wisconsin's objective analysis of unusual
stress, because the Commission applied a traumatic injury analysis, the language is merely
dicta. Further, the case is unpublished and of no precedential value.
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usualness and that the door is not opened to excessive fraudulent
claims.
Two states utilizing tests akin to Wisconsin's unusual stress test have
effectively addressed these considerations in the area of high stress occu-
pations. Arizona, the first state to address the issue, and Pennsylvania,
the state with the most recently developed law on the issue, apply similar
objective approaches to compensation. 191
In 1978, the Arizona Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
whether a highway patrolman could recover benefits for a mental injury
in Sloss v. Industrial Commission.192 The patrolman developed chronic
anxiety due to job-related stress.193 In denying benefits based on the fact
that the patrolman was not subjected to unusual stress, the court deter-
mined that the stress is measured within the occupation, and not the
stress within the general population. "[T]he stresses to which the appli-
cant was exposed in his employment were the same as, and no greater
than, those imposed upon all other Highway Patrolmen in the same type
of duty.' '1 94
With the explicit adoption of language akin to the Sloss interpreta-
tion or to the "similarly situated" language of Probst,195 Wisconsin's un-
usual stress standard would be substantially clearer. Thus, the test would
encompass the initial School District No. 1 language coupled with an ad-
ditional component to clarify the meaning of "unusual."
When analyzing workers' compensation cases in the realm of high
stress occupations, the distinction becomes less clear. Attempts to pro-
vide a solution range from an elimination of high stress claims due to the
lack of unusualness,196 to a legislative enactment that would carve out a
191. See, e.g., Sloss v. Industrial Comm'n, 588 P.2d 303, (Ariz. 1978). Arizona was one of
the first states to apply an unusual stress test to high stress occupations. Id. at 304. Penn-
sylvania most recently developed the law in this area to allow the compensability of high stress
claims if they meet the "abnormal working conditions" test. Two recent cases set forth the
standard: Squilla v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 606 A.2d 539 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1991); and City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 583 A.2d 852 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1154 (1991).
192. 588 P.2d 303 (Ariz. 1978).
193. Id. at 304.
194. Id. at 304-05.
195. See Probst v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 153 Wis. 2d 185, 191, 450 N.W.2d 478,
480 (Ct. App. 1989).
196. See, e.g., City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 583 A.2d 852,
860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (Silvestri, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1154 (1991). The
dissenting opinion in Scranton stated:
By holding that a high stress work environment is, in and of itself, a sufficient work
related abnormality, the majority creates a dangerous precedent. Many types of jobs
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presumption of work-relatedness in these cases. 197 However, recent de-
velopments in Pennsylvania present the most logical, middle-ground ap-
proach to compensating mental injuries within high stress occupations.
In 1990, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court faced the issue of
whether a police officer's stress resulted from exposure to "abnormal
working conditions" in City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board.198 The widow of a police officer alleged that her hus-
band's unusually stressful working conditions caused his depression and
eventual self-inflicted death.199 No dispute arose as to whether the of-
ficer suffered from depression, rather the inquiry focused upon whether
the conditions were indeed abnormal.200
Pennsylvania's abnormal working condition test holds that the
mental injury "itself must have resulted from the claimant's objective
reaction to 'abnormal working conditions.'"201 The City of Scranton ar-
gued that the widow could not meet this test because high stress is nor-
mal in police work.2°z In rejecting this reasoning, the court adopted
language from a dissenting opinion of a previous case to alleviate the
problem in high stress occupations.' 3 The court noted that many jobs
by their nature are high stress, and for these occupations high stress is
normal.2" Noted examples included an air traffic controller, a school
teacher in a ghetto area, or a police officer2 °5 To combat a finding of
work-relatedness in all high stress claims, the court held that:
[F]or a high stress working environment to constitute a legally
sufficient abnormal working condition, there must be a finding
either that claimant's work performance (as distinguished from the
mere job description) was unusually stressful for that kind of a job
are, by their very nature, high stress. Such occupation as ... a police officer, for
example, may well be viewed as high stress; but for these particular positions high stress
is normal.
Id. (Silvestri, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell Tel. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.,
487 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)).
197. See, e.g., Girdwood, supra note 11, at 627.
198. 583 A.2d 852 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1154 (1991).
199. Id. at 853.
200. Id. at 854.
201. Id. (citing Martin v. Ketchum, Inc., 568 A.2d 159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)).
202. Id. at 855.
203. See id. at 855-56 (citing Bell Tel. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 487
A.2d 1053 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (Doyle, J., concurring and dissenting)).
204. Id. at 855 (quoting Bell Tel. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 487 A.2d
1053 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (Doyle, J., concurring and dissenting)).
205. Id.
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
or a finding that an unusual event occurred making the job more
stressful than it had been.20 6
In this case, the police officer was assigned to investigate a serial
killer.20 7 Prior to this killing spree, the city had not encountered a signif-
icant number of murders.208 In addition to the responsibility of investi-
gating every case, the officer bore the pressure of solving the crimes,
both from the police department and the community.20 9 Finding that
these responsibilities clearly became unusually stressful conditions for
the type of work he was assigned to perform, the court held that he was
exposed to abnormal working conditions and compensation was
granted.210
One year later, the opposite result was reached in Squilla v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Board.211 In this case the commonwealth
court denied benefits to a patrol officer who claimed mental injury after
being reprimanded for unsatisfactory performance.212 Applying the
Scranton test, the court stated that proper administration and regimenta-
tion are necessary in the officer's occupation.213 Further, this type of
discipline was normal for that kind of job.21 4
The straightforward approach set forth in Scranton allows compensa-
tion of valid claims arising from gradual stress or a single event, provided
that the stress is unusual for that particular job. This resolves the ques-
tion of whether a police officer in a small town with little crime should
be compared to a police officer in a large city inundated with crime. The
comparison is within the context of the work involved and focuses on the
job description.21 5 In Scranton, the officer was employed in a small town
with relatively few crimes.21 6 An intense investigation of a serial killer is
objectively unusual for that police department. If the officer was as-
signed to a homicide unit in a large city, murder investigations would not
only be expected by the city, but the employee would be aware of the
implications of the job prior to accepting it. That is not to say that if an
206. Id. at 856.
207. Id. at 857.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 858-59.
211. 606 A.2d 539 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
212. Id. at 543.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. City of Scranton v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 583 A.2d 852, 857 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1154 (1991).
216. Id.
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officer employed in a homicide unit were to become inundated with a
greater volume of stressful cases or responsibilities, as compared to the
officer's co-workers, that compensation would not be warranted. The
crucial element of the test includes the language "work performance ...
[that is] unusually stressful for that kind of a job." 17 Rather than elimi-
nating all high stress claims as "normal" or presuming a high stress envi-
ronment to be a work-related abnormality, this test serves as an
appropriate middle ground between two uncompromising positions.
Combining a clarified School District No. I test with the Scranton
standard for high stress occupations would serve to provide Wisconsin
with a workable test designed to compensate genuine claims and to re-
ject feigned illnesses and fraudulent claims.
V. COMPENSATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PTSD UNDER A
MODIFIED UNusuAL STREss TEST
Evidence demonstrating the recent increase in police stress 218 and
the frequent development of PTSD in officers2 19 indicates that courts
across the nation will soon be facing these issues in the realm of workers'
compensation. Wisconsin has yet to address the compensation of PTSD
within a high stress working environment. Therefore, a method of ana-
lyzing such cases is necessary to adhere to a modified unusual stress test.
Although PTSD is defined as a condition caused by an event
"outside the range of usual human experience,"' 0 the development of
the mental illness does not automatically satisfy the unusual stress test.
A mental injury of any kind, regardless of its definition, will not be com-
pensated unless it arises from stresses that are unusual for that occupa-
tional context. Merely because PTSD arises from an event uncommon
to most people, an award of compensation is not ensured, and a test
must be applied to determine if the event is unusual for that occupation.
An event precipitating PTSD may be common for certain kinds of jobs,
particularly those of law enforcement officers.221 Thus, once the claim-
ant is diagnosed with PTSD, a determination of work-relatedness must
be made.22 The use of the modified unusual stress test will aid in this
inquiry.
217. See id. at 856.
218. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
220. DSM-III-R, supra note 20, at 250.
221. Mann & Neece, supra note 7, at 452.
222. Id.
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To effectively examine a police officer's PTSD claim, a three-step
process should be employed. First, PTSD must be proved. Although the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders'- provides a defi-
nition and framework of symptoms, only through an inquiry into the cir-
cumstances surrounding the officer's life will a valid diagnosis result.2' 4
Factors within the individual's personal life may obscure the diagnosis."-'
For example, a police officer suffering family problems may develop
symptoms of anxiety or depression, some of which are markedly similar
to PTSD.2 2 6 To combat a "checklist" approach to diagnosing PTSD,2 27
the use of detection testing combined with expert testimony will help to
validate a psychiatrist's diagnosis of PTSD.
Second, the causation barrier must be crossed.228 Considering that
psychiatric injuries are inherently subjective, the possibility of an injury
arising from stresses other than those within the occupation is inevitable.
An examination of exactly when the officer manifested symptoms of
mental harm serves to determine if a work-related event precipitated the
illness.229
The inquiry does not end at causation, however, because regardless
of an initial showing of work-relatedness, a final threshold of unusual-
ness is needed to validate the causal relation.230 The modified unusual
stress test facilitates the process. In the case of a law enforcement officer
who develops PTSD after a duty-related event, the officer's stress must
not be a subjective reaction to a normal occurrence. The only way to
objectify an inherently subjective injury is to compare the stress of the
officer with the stress endured by other officers in the same type of
job.231 If, for example, a work-related shooting arose in a small town
with few crimes, the officer's chances for compensation are greater.
Prior to taking the job, the officer was not under the expectation that the
stress would rise to such a level.
223. DSM-III-R, supra note 20, at 250-51.
224. See Lees-Haley, supra note 14, at 18.
225. Id. at 18-19.
226. Id. at 18.
227. See Sparr & Boehnlein, supra note 14, at 290.
228. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
229. See Harlton, supra note 78, at 821.
230. See School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 62 Wis.
2d 370, 377-78, 215 N.W.2d 373, 377 (1974).
231. See Probst v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 153 Wis. 2d 185, 191,450 N.W.2d 478,
480 (Ct. App. 1989).
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However, utilizing an example of an officer assigned to a drug or
gang unit in a large city where shootings frequently occur, the officer's
possibility of compensation is less likely. The officer, who is highly
screened for such a job, was aware of the job description prior to com-
mencing his or her duties. Again, the test should not be used to elimi-
nate valid claims, especially those arising from situations in which an
officer performs work that is uncharacteristic for that kind of job.
Although it can be argued that this approach loses sight of the premise
underlying the workers' compensation system, which is to take the em-
ployee "as is" with any pre-existing disposition to injury,232 Wisconsin
rejects an approach that analyzes physical and mental injuries in the
same manner. 3 Thus, while the "as is" doctrine may apply to physical
injuries, Wisconsin has decided that mental injuries must cross an addi-
tional threshold of unusualness. This threshold is the only reasonable
way to ensure that the element of work-relatedness is established.
VI. CONCLUSION
The explosion of occupational stress strikes this nation with great
force, leaving in its wake a plethora of legal claims. Work-related stress
claims tend to burden industries, the workers' compensation system, and
society as a whole, with problems incapable of adequate resolution.
In the area of law enforcement, the stress is of a different kind and
magnitude than that endured by the majority of this country's workers.
The effect of the continual danger encountered by police officers daily is
incomprehensible to the average employee. Yet, most agree that pro-
tecting citizens from an increasingly violent society is vital. In recogniz-
ing the value of law enforcement occupations, compensation should
certainly be available to those suffering from the inevitable rise in
mental illness. The workers' compensation system is designed to pro-
vide benefits to injured employees, thereby enabling them to return to
gainful employment. 4 Equally as important, though, is society's inter-
est in preserving its economic structure and preventing the creation of a
health insurance system. It is the balancing of these two interests that
must be addressed when proposing any method to evaluate stress cases.
232. See Sersland, supra note 13, at 773.
233. See Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis.
2d 46, 54, 240 N.W.2d 128, 131-32 (1976).
234. See 1B LAWsoN, supra note 9, § 1.00.
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In light of these compelling considerations, a modified unusual stress test
serves to satisfy both ideals.
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